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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores aspects of risk and safety in health care. Patient safety is 
about preventing harm to patients. A perspective of resilience is used, which is 
a proactive approach to making care safer. Resilient organisations recognise the 
fact that work is done in a complex and adaptive system that can be improved, 
not only by studying what goes wrong, but even more so by studying what 
works well. The thesis adds to previous research by studying patient safety in 
first-contact care, primary health care and the emergency department,  resulting 
in new knowledge that could be used to make care safer.
We investigated reported preventable harm and serious safety incidents in 
 primary health care and in emergency departments (Study I). In these contexts, 
diagnostic error was the most common type. A diagnostic error is when a patient 
does not receive the correct diagnosis within a reasonable timeframe  when there 
were clear opportunities to establish the correct diagnosis. The consequence 
is delayed adequate treatment. There is limited  knowledge of the  panorama 
of diagnoses that are involved in diagnostic errors. We explored the diagnoses 
that were most frequent in this material. Cancer was the most common missed 
diagnosis in primary health care, in particular colorectal cancer, and fractures 
were the most common missed diagnoses in the emergency departments.
Furthermore, little is known about patient-related risk factors for preventable 
harm. We explored factors associated with an increased risk of reported pre-
ventable harm, or serious safety incidents, in primary health care and in the 
emergency departments (Study II). The most prominent risk was psychiatric 
disease. This was, to our knowledge, the first study in an out-patient setting, 
with all types of psychiatric diseases.
This thesis also examines what patients and health care professionals per-
ceived as the major risks in primary health care and what solutions they 
would prefer (Study III and IV). Solutions generated from the  people in 
the system are likely to be more accurate and easier to implement than top-
down  solutions. In Study III, qualitative analysis of free-text answers to 
structured questionnaires was performed. The results were used to build a 
survey for Study IV, where specified risks and solutions were rated accord-
ing to importance. Regarding risks, the areas that were thought to need 
most improvement were continuity of care, communication and knowledge. 
Solutions included: information about what to do when tests were fine, 
but symptoms remained, so called  safety-netting; the use of a nationwide 
medication record online; and a personal doctor with a restricted number of 
patients per doctor, to facilitate continuity of care.
These studies support future work for safer and more resilient health care. 
There were suggestions from the level of the general practice up to the national 
level. Further research should test interventions that proactively support sys-
tems in improved accuracy in diagnosis and correct medication, for example, 
an intervention to improve continuity of care or to practice safety-netting. 
Proactive interventions like these could probably improve the resilience of 
the system in question. 
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1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ED Emergency department
GP General practitioner
NAM National Academy of Medicine
OR Odds ratio
PHC Primary health care
QI Quality Improvement 
RCA Root Cause Analysis
WAD Work-as-done 
WAI Work-as-imagined 
WHO World Health Organization
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2 DEFINITIONS AND COMMONLY USED 
CONCEPTS 
Ambulatory care Primary health care and the emergency department
Patient safety Prevention of errors and adverse effects to patients 
associated with health care
Safety I A system is safe if as little as possible – and preferably 
nothing – goes wrong. In other words, if there are no 
accidents or incidents.
Safety II A system is safe if as much as possible goes well.
Safety incidents Incidents of harm or near misses (near harm).
System 1 System 1 refers to a way of fast thinking, mostly 
based om pattern recognition and sometimes called 
our “auto-pilot”.
System 2 System 2 refers to a slower way of thinking that is more 
analytical and usually less prone to error.
Resilience A system is resilient if it can adjust its functioning prior 
to, during, or following events (changes, disturbances, 
and opportunities), and thereby sustain required opera-
tions under both expected and unexpected conditions.
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3 PROLOGUE
Patient safety is the subject of this thesis. The focus is on primary health care 
(PHC) and care in the emergency department (ED). The fact that patients can 
be harmed when they seek health care is frustrating and should not happen 
when it is possible to avoid. I will in this thesis explore different aspects of 
safety and possibilities for making care safer, through the lens of resilience. 
Resilience in health care is the ability to deliver good and safe care under 
varying conditions and has a proactive approach. Preventable harm can for 
example come from health care associated infections, avoidable falls, medica-
tion errors or delayed diagnoses. Meeting patients that have been harmed by 
health care has motivated me to focus on the area of patient safety. Below is 
an example of diagnostic delay that should not need to happen (fictional case 
based on several reports of preventable harm).
Thomas was a man in his mid-sixties who came to a General Practitioner (GP) 
practice. He didn’t have a personal GP and met with a locum physician, a 
temporary doctor. The doctor was working for just two weeks at the practice 
before moving on. Thomas had had some trouble with depression on and off. 
Now his stomach was bothering him. The doctor examined him quickly, no 
rectal exam, and ordered some laboratory tests. Thomas felt a bit neglected 
but didn’t speak up. He did not receive advice about what to look out for and 
when he should come back. Thomas waited for the lab results for a week or 
so but since he didn’t hear anything, he assumed the lab work had been fine. 
The stomach kept bothering him. Finally, after 3 months, he sought care 
again. Now the previous lab results were brought to attention, with anaemia 
and signs of iron deficiency. Colonoscopy was made 4 weeks after the second 
visit. Thomas had colon cancer. Computer tomography of the stomach showed 
that the cancer had spread to the liver. 
I began to learn more about patient safety and exploring safety has made me 
realise that the health care system is a large and highly complex system, har-
bouring smaller complex systems within. During my doctoral studies I have 
come to a greater understanding of the complexity and adaptability of the health 
care system. Also, the necessity for the patient to take a central role in work 
with quality and safety has grown strong for me over the years. The language 
used in the thesis is chosen to facilitate spread outside of the academia.
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4 BACKGROUND
4.1 Patient safety and resilience
A simple definition of patient safety according to the World Health Organization 
(WHO) is the prevention of errors and adverse effects to patients associated with 
health care [1]. In this thesis, on the subject of patient safety, the framework of 
resilience is used. A definition of resilience is that a system is resilient if it can 
adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following events (changes, disturbances, 
and opportunities), and thereby sustain required operations under both expected 
and unexpected conditions [2]. It is a framework that takes into consideration 
that health care takes place in an adaptive complex system. Resilience also uses 
the perspective of being proactive when it comes to safety. The framework is 
therefore chosen because it can be a valuable tool for making care safer.
Health care is an example of a complex system [3]. With complex systems one 
usually means that there are many different components which interact with 
each other and that the outcome is hard to predict. The health care system is a 
large and highly complex system, harbouring smaller complex systems within. 
The system is also an adaptive system by nature. When addressing safety, it is 
important to view the aspects of system safety since it will widen the under-
standing of the reasons for harm. Thereby, the countermeasures can be more 
appropriate and proactive. Harm is seldom due to a specific person, but more 
often due to a type of situation that keeps repeating itself. 
There are other frameworks, for example to analyse errors and address contribu-
tion factors that are identified, often via Root Cause Analysis (RCA) [4]. That 
type of framework has also been called safety-I to emphasise the traditional 
view of safety opposed to the perspective of resilience that is called safety-II 
[5]. Erik Hollnagel points out the difference between safety-I and safety-II [2]. 
Safety-I is about avoiding things going wrong, focusing on finding the cause of 
harm and fix it. Safety-II is about seeing to that as much as possible goes right, 
by learning from everyday success in order to make the system safer. Regarding 
diagnoses it can be interpreted as striving for as high as possible percentage 
of correct diagnoses in a timely manner. In safety-II, a system is resilient if it 
can adjust to different kinds of disturbances and still work with good results. 
A system has properties of resilience when it has the ability to “bounce back” 
and remain safe under different conditions. Safety-II does not replace safety-I 
but complements it and brings with it a more proactive view on safety. Not only 
systems can have properties of resilience, but individuals can also be more or 
less resilient. An individual can handle setbacks and difficulties with more or less 
appropriate strategies and thereby handle a situation with more or less success. 
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When discussing resilience, there is a need to mention work-as-imagined 
(WAI) and work-as-done (WAD) [5]. Work-as-imagined is the work as it is 
supposed to be performed, to “work by the book”. Work-as-imagined can be 
difficult or impossible to do because of the information overload that is present 
in health care, because patients can have more than one condition or because 
of lack of resources. Work-as-done is how the work is done in real life, with 
all the adjustments that the health care professionals need to do in order to get 
the job done. In PHC many patients are elderly and have multimorbidity and 
polypharmacy which makes it difficult to standardise care and to work accord-
ing till WAI. To work for safer health care, one needs to realise the concept 
of work-as-imagined and work-as-done. To simply remind people to do the 
correct thing has a very small effect on safety. In contrast, if work-as-done is 
known, measures to make the care safer can have a greater impact [5].
Safety is often seen as a component of quality of care. Quality and safety in 
health care are intertwined and safe care is an important aspect of quality [6]. If 
the care is not safe, the patient could get harmed in her or his contact with health 
care. Apart from the tragedy of harming the patient, the confidence in health 
care can decrease [7], with the result of people in need not seeking health care.
4.2 Patient safety and types of harm 
Patient safety is according to WHO defined as the prevention of errors and 
adverse effects to patients associated with health care [1], as mentioned above. 
Classic areas of concerns regarding patient safety have been medication errors, 
unsafe surgical care procedures, unsafe injections practices, health care associ-
ated infections, falls and inappropriate treatments. In PHC medication errors 
and diagnostic errors are the two types of errors resulting in the most severe 
consequences [8]. Medication errors are common and have been subject to 
many studies during the past decades while diagnostic errors have not received 
the same attention. However, diagnostic error is a fast-growing area in patient 
safety, with ambulatory care as major contributors of cases, as a result of their 
context as the first contact with health care when new symptoms arise. This 
thesis study both medication errors and diagnostic errors, where the latter 
requires more background being newer in the flied of research.
Former Institute of Medicine (IOM) and now National Academy of Medicine 
(NAM) defines diagnostic error as the failure to (a) establish an accurate and 
timely explanation of the patient’s health problem(s) or (b) communicate that 
explanation to the patient [9]. Preventable harm due to diagnostic error is thus 
when the treatment is delayed to the extent that the patient suffers harm, in the 
case that there were clear opportunities to establish a correct diagnosis [7]. In 
2015 the report Improving Diagnosis in Health care was published by NAM [10], 
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and exposed the problem of diagnostic error. In Sweden, diagnostic errors con-
stitute approximately 10-20% of all serious preventable harm and in the context 
PHC and EDs, diagnostic errors make up more than 40% [11]. In PHC many 
patients seek with symptoms rather than with clear cut diagnosis, which could 
be an explanation for the high percentage of diagnostic errors. The ED setting is 
to some extend similar to PHC in that respect and diagnostic errors constitutes 
a major part of preventable harm [12]. An obvious and important difference is 
the PHC’s possibility to use continuity of care as an instrument for safer care.
There are several reasons for increased importance of diagnostic errors. First, 
our ability to investigate and establish different diagnoses has improved over 
the last decades. Second, treatments are increasingly effective. We can now 
treat acute myocardial infarction, stroke, cancer and many types of infections 
in ways that were not possible a few decades ago. Therefore, the consequences 
of late diagnosis are more severe. Third, with the pattern of travel nowadays, 
delayed diagnoses of infectious diseases have potentially greater impact now 
than earlier. Forth, there is a great cost associated with both under- and over-
diagnosis [13]. Finally, the consequeces of diagnsotic errors are often more 
severe than the consequeces of other types or errors [9].
Diagnostic errors are unfortunately difficult to measure [7]. The time frame of 
“timely” can differ immensely if we talk about acute myocardial infarction or 
colon cancer. Each case must be evaluated to see if the patient has experienced 
harm because a late or wrong diagnosis and that there were apparent missed 
opportunities for the right diagnosis to be made in a timely manner. 
4.2.1 The diagnostic process
The diagnosis is essential to the practice of medicine. The diagnosis explains 
the patient’s health problems, gives information about prognosis and what 
treatment should be given the patient. The diagnostic process is a process that 
usually starts with limited information and gathers information along the way, 
and it is therefore sometimes called the diagnostic trajectory, as information 
and certainty increase by time. 
The diagnostic process begins with a person that has symptoms of a health 
problem and seeks health care (Figure 1). Information is gathered through 
medical history, physical exam and diagnostic testing. Often there are more 
people involved than just the doctor and the patient; maybe a consultant, maybe 
a radiologist, maybe a nurse or maybe a family member. In the process the 
information is interpreted, and a working diagnosis is made that is communi-
cated to the patient. Treatment is given, which can result in new information 
that might adjust the diagnosis and treatment (red arrow in Figure 1). Finally, 
the patient has an outcome. There can be a break-down in all different parts of 
the dianostic process [14], and contributing factors can be cognitive, system-
related, or non-remedial, often overlapping [15]. 
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4.2.2 Diagnostic reasoning
A diagnostic error can be a result of failure in the diagnostic reasoning and 
decision making. The base of diagnostic reasoning is medical rationality which 
include critical thinking, intellectual ability, knowledge and individual charac-
teristics [16]. Rationality is according to Merriam-Webster Dictionary defined 
as “the quality or state of being rational or being agreeable to reason” [17].
Decision making can be understood as either non-analytic or analytic, often 
called system 1 and system 2 or the dual-process model [18, 19], displayed in 
Table 1. In system 1, the non-analytic, decision making is fast, intuitive, and 
based on pattern recognition. It is very time efficient, but it is also thought to 
be prone to error and vulnerable for biases [20]. System 2 is analytic, more 
time consuming, more precise, but can also be affected by different kinds of 
biases. The latter is especially true if a person is only reasoning with them-
selves, not testing the possibilities of alternative diagnoses in discussion with 
others. The human brain tends to look for arguments that confirm our first 
theory, resulting in the misconception that we are thinking analytically, but 
we are just searching for arguments to justify our initial theory [21]. Critical 
thinking is thus best done in teams [22].
Table 1. Properties of system 1 (non-analytic) and system 2 (analytic) [20]. 
System 1 System 2
Fast Slow
Effortless Effortful
Unconscious Conscious
Automatic Controlled
Everyday decisions Complex decisions
Heuristic Analytic
System 1 is used more by experienced medical health care professionals and 
system 2 is used more by the less experienced [23]. System 1 can work by 
pattern recognition where the clinician can recognise a diagnosis that one has 
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seen before. For example, a woman with frequent, painful urination receive 
the diagnosis of urinary bladder infection, even though it can be symptom of 
chlamydia. If the clinician had a patient the day before with chlamydia the 
clinician can more easily remember to ask questions for the medical history 
to avoid missing chlamydia. The non-analytic system is comfortable and since 
the human brain is lazy by nature, we tend to spend a lot of time in system 
1. The danger is when we are not aware of when we are using system 1 and 
when we are using system 2 [20]. We need to be aware of that and alternate 
between the systems whenever it is appropriate. 
To actively consider alternative diagnoses, system 2 is usually needed [23]. If 
the clinician gets stuck in system 1, there are ways to force oneself into sys-
tem 2. For example, “the rule of three”, meaning that the clinician hypothesis 
three possible diagnoses to explain the patient’s symptoms. Control questions 
can be used; What suggests another diagnosis? What else could it be? Could 
there be more than one problem? In PHC the doctor usually has a diagnosis 
in mind very fast and often trusts his gut feeling [24]. Quick and convenient 
– but maybe it is the wrong diagnosis.
4.2.2.1 Biases that affect diagnostic reasoning
There are different types of biases that can affect the clinician in the medi-
cal decision making and those are discussed in this section [23]. There is the 
group-thinking effect that makes the clinician more prone to think what others 
are thinking [25]. The human usually feels safer when fitting in with a group. 
This effect becomes stronger the more people that agree on a subject. So, if 
something is said during rounds or is written in the chart, that tends to be under-
stood as true. Medical reasoning can also be negatively affected by “cognitive 
fixation”, meaning to get stuck in the initial hypothesis and not revaluate the 
decision, also called the anchoring effect [26]. The patient might then receive 
the wrong diagnosis. Another important factor that affects diagnostic reasoning 
is how well calibrated the doctor is to his abilities. Overconfidence in diagnostic 
ability can lead to incorrect diagnoses and low confidence can lead to defensive 
medicine. Good calibration is important for optimal diagnostic reasoning [27].
Availability error means that the clinician is prone to think that the diagno-
sis is one that the clinician has seen recently [28]. For example, respiratory 
symptoms that are interpreted as asthma and medication is prescribed. Later 
the diagnosis turns out to be heart failure or thrombosis. Confirmation bias 
causes the clinician to try to confirm an early hypothesis. For example, the 
patient might have googled his symptoms and arrives to the doctor with an 
already formed hypothesis. Affection error means that medical reasoning can 
be affected if the clinician likes a patient too much, like a family member. For 
example, the clinician does not want to find serious illness in a family member 
or is embarrassed to perform a complete physical examination. 
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Attribution error is when the clinician has notions about a patient beforehand, 
for example, if it is known that the patient drinks excessive amounts of alcohol 
and therefore the elevated liver enzymes are not investigated for other pos-
sible causes. Satisfaction of search means that the clinician stops searching 
as soon as one possible explanation is found, a common reason for diagnostic 
errors in radiology [29]. For example, the radiologist seeing a pneumonia on 
the x-ray stops looking (often unconsciously) and miss an osteolytic metastasis 
on the clavicula. Diagnostic momentum is when a diagnosis is said or written 
in the chart and the belief in the diagnosis becomes stronger and stronger even 
though the evidence can be scarce [28]. The clinician wants to work fast and 
it is easy to use selective perception and selective information gathering to fit 
the diagnosis with the initial hypothesis. That leads to premature closure. To 
have knowledge of the different types of biases can make the clinician better 
at critical thinking [23].
4.2.2.2 Further factors affecting diagnostic reasoning
An important element for the medical reasoning and medical decision-making 
is medical knowledge, including knowledge of probability [23]. The epidemi-
ology of PHC affects the probability of different diagnoses. If a patient seeks 
help for joint pain in PHC, little is gained from testing rheumatic blood-work 
if there is no evident inflammation in the joints. Another factor that plays a 
role in diagnostic reasoning is good ability to communicate. Communication 
between health care professionals has tangible effects on patient safety and the 
risk for diagnostic errors, like the language misinterpretations in responses to 
referrals and radiology results. Unfortunately, standardised language is seldom 
used [30]. Communication is also of utter most importance when it comes to 
hand-off and transfer of care and also between health care professionals and 
patients. 
The risk for wrong or delayed diagnosis also increases if one trusts the pro-
spective memory [31]. That means that the doctor tells himself to do some-
thing later on but have no specific trigger for remembering to do it. This kind 
of postponed actions are especially vulnerable for distractions. As a GP, one 
sees many patients in a day and interruptions are very common. For example, 
when a doctor meets a patient that could have cancer and needs a referral, the 
doctor may think “I will send the referral after the next patient because I’m 
running behind my schedule”. Then the doctor gets distracted by a phone call 
or a colleague who needs to ask a question.
Cognitive work is about dynamic attention (what to focus on, when, to the 
expenses of what), knowledge (how to learn, store, activate and use knowledge), 
and strategic factors (how to handle limitations and goals in the organisation 
where the work is done) [32]. Health care has apparent cognitive challenges; 
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stressful work environment, multi-tasking and relaying on prospective memory. 
It this environment is easy to be affected by cognitive pitfalls like the anchor-
ing effect. In addition, there are individual factors like education, experience, 
tiredness (which severely affects the executive function of the brain), hunger, 
thirst, ability to think critically, emotional state, tolerance for cognitive pres-
sure, tolerance for group pressure, over-confidence and finally stress, both 
short-term and long-term [23]. Time pressure affects the quality of the medi-
cal reasoning negatively, but it is actually not the true restraint of time that is 
important, but the experience of time pressure [33]. If you feel stressed the 
quality of your decisions will be lower. Stress leads to “tunnel vision”, paraly-
sis and shallow information gathering, affecting the ability to decide on the 
correct diagnosis [34, 35]. 
Team factors are also important for diagnosis [36]. There are usually more 
people involved in a diagnosis than just the patient and the doctor. There are 
nurses, consultants, laboratory staff, family members and so on. The team is 
often not as visible in PHC as in a hospital. If these teams, many times tem-
porary teams, do not work well together, there is a risk for diagnostic error. To 
work well together the team needs to have shared mental models. The idea is 
that team performance improves if team members have a shared understand-
ing of the task that is to be performed and their part of the team [37]. That 
improves the so called sensemaking which is important for teams as well as 
for patients [38, 39].
Moreover, systemic factors play an important role when it comes to patient 
safety and diagnostic errors [40]. They include work environment and ambient 
conditions (availability of care, patient engagement, diagnostics like laboratory 
and radiology, consultants, coordination of care and routines for follow-up). 
The patient plays a central role in the diagnostic process [41], with the knowl-
edge of all the symptoms and for carrying vital information through the care 
process. While many of the members in the diagnostic team change during the 
diagnostic process, the patient remains. The patient is also the one that cares 
the most that the diagnosis is correct. 
4.3 Reports of harm and incident analysis
In Sweden, patients that have experienced harm can report to a nation-wide 
insurance company, owned by the Regions (the local governmental level in 
Sweden that is responsible for publicly-financed health care and public trans-
portation). The company is called Landstingets Ömsesidiga Försäkringsbolag 
(LÖF). The incident is evaluated by health care professionals trained in inci-
dent analysis to see if there has been preventable harm, and in those cases the 
patient will be financially compensated. Health care facilities also report safety 
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incidents (incidents of harm or near misses). Health care are obliged by law to 
analyse and report serious safety incidents to the authorities. The reports from 
health care are called lex Maria. The Regions and single health care facili-
ties also have their own reporting systems. Incidents are analysed as a mean 
of learning and improving the systems. Some RCA made by the Regions are 
reported online to a national database as an opportunity for learning. However, 
there is literally no data source that gives information about all harm. 
A way to analyse safety incidents is RCA, constructed to use the perspective 
of safety I [4]. When a patient has been harmed in health care an RCA can 
shed light on the different causes that contributed to the harm, for example, 
why a diagnostic error has occurred. However, it is difficult to analyse cause 
and effect in complex systems since there often are many causes that could 
have contributed to the outcome. RCAs tends to be used in a linear way, not 
considering the plasticity of reality. With a safety II-perspective the RCA can 
be modified for a deeper understanding of the situation or one could conduct a 
“positive root cause analysis” to explore why a situation worked out well. That 
perspective can be a source of learning about the system and a way to improve 
the system. It can sometimes be hard to distinguish the boundaries of the system 
to be included in the RCA, since the different systems in health care are open 
systems and dependent on one another, as well as dependent on their context. 
In establishing the diagnosis, the information needed can be spread between 
systems, among health care professionals, in different electronic health record 
systems and between primary and secondary care. The RCA needs to include 
all parts involved in the diagnostic process, which often can pose a challenge 
in performing the analysis.
Another known model for analysing errors is the Swiss-cheese model, widely 
used but with variations in interpretations [42]. It is a model of barriers that 
describes how latent conditions combined with active failures can lead to harm 
[43]. When a patient suffers from preventable harm there are usually several 
things that did not go as planned, symbolised by the holes in the slices of 
cheese. In the Swiss-cheese model the focus is on finding erroneous situations 
to be able to correct them, like the concept of safety I. Related to diagnostic 
error this model can be used proactively to build in safety barriers in the sys-
tem, like safe routines for follow-up on lab results. The patient can also be a 
barrier to harm by reading his electronic health record online and make sure 
that a referral is carried out, or that lab results are reported back to the patient.
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4.4 Rationals for the thesis
Preventable harm is an issue of interest in most countries and targeting pre-
ventable harm could lead to major quality improvement (QI) in care and could 
also be cost-effective [44]. An aspect of safe care is that the patient receive a 
correct diagnosis in a timely manner leading to adequate treatment [9]. Patients 
with new symptoms and unknown diagnosis seek ambulatory care, like PHC 
or the ED. Therefore, ambulatory care wrestles with a high density of decision-
making regarding diagnoses and a higher risk of diagnostic errors than other 
settings. It is known that diagnostic errors is a major issue in these settings 
[7, 9], but only a few studies have explored the diagnoses involved [45, 46]. 
The gap regarding diagnoses involved is addressed in Study I. Knowledge of 
which diagnoses are involved could facilitate safety work.
There are known risks of harm in health care. Transfer of care is one and lack 
of continuity of care is another [9]. Older patients and patients with many 
medications have a higher risk of harm [47]. In addition, patients with serious 
mental illness have shown to have an increased risk of harm in hospitals [48]. 
Apart from that, there is a gap regarding which patients have an increased 
risk of experiencing harm in ambulatory care. If we know the patient-related 
factors associated with higher risk of preventable harm, appropriate proactive 
measures can be designed to make care more resilient. We explored which 
patient-related factors that were associated with a higher risk of preventable 
harm and serious safety incidents (Study II). 
To take measures for safer care is not easy, especially to implement the measures 
in daily work. If the solutions for a safer care are influenced by the opinion 
of patients that have experienced harm, and by the health care professionals 
working in health care, the implementation can be facilitated [49]. There are 
some studies regarding what health care professionals think could improve 
safety, for example improved communication [50, 51]. In addition, patients 
have pointed out patient-centred ways to improve safety [52]. However, there 
is still a gap regarding what health care professionals, and especially patients 
that have experienced preventable harm, believe to be the most important 
risks and preferred solutions for these risks. We explored views of patients 
and health care professionals in Study III-IV. Safety research has mainly been 
reactive over the past decades. We wanted to search for proactive means to 
mitigate risks. In Study III-IV we looked for answers about where we should 
focus our efforts and what we should prioritise to do, in order to achieve a 
safer and more resilient care. 
26
5 AIMS
The overall objective of the thesis was to study aspects of safety in PHC and 
the EDs.
The specific aims of the studies were:
• To study which diagnoses that are affected when it comes to diagnostic 
errors in PHC and the EDs (Study I).
• To study which patient-related factors are associated with a higher risk of 
preventable harm in PHC and in the EDs (Study II).
• To explore the views of patients and health care professionals in PHC 
regarding patient safety issues and possible solutions for a safer care 
(Study III).
• To explore how patients and health care professionals in PHC ranked 
specified risks and solutions for patient safety issues (Study IV).
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6 MATERIAL AND METHODS
6.1 Setting
Swedish PHC and EDs are merged in Study I and II. When patients experi-
ence new health problems in form of new symptoms, they usually seek help 
from PHC. If they believe the condition is serious or give rise to aggravated 
symptoms, they seek the ED. So, in these contexts there are a high density of 
decisions making concerning diagnoses because the clinicians are exposed to 
unsorted patients [53]. In PHC in Sweden the patient chooses a personal doc-
tor or a GP-practice. The GP has a gate-keeping function and makes referrals 
to specialised care. 
The epidemiology in these contexts is important to consider. In PHC the serious 
diagnoses are rare. There is a constant “noise” of symptoms from the patients. 
When a serious disease occurs, the symptoms usually present themselves 
together with symptoms of other conditions of that patient, which can conceal 
the severity of the situation. To pinpoint the serious diagnoses in PHC can be a 
true challenge, like finding a needle in a haystack. In the ED there is a different 
spectrum of symptoms and diseases, even though it can overlap with PHC. In 
this context the serious diagnoses are more common while the patients still 
seek with new symptoms and many times with unknown diagnoses.
Finally, the upcoming reorganisation of Swedish health care (from 2018 and 
ongoing) needs to be mentioned. The Swedish government has the intention 
to support the regions, relevant government agencies and organisations in the 
coordinated development of a modern, equitable, accessible and efficient health 
care service, focusing on PHC. The program is called “The coordinated develop-
ment for good quality, local health care – A primary health care reform” [54]. It 
will focus the care closer to the patient. The intention is good but will probably 
result in not yet foreseen risks of harm, as any major organisational change.
6.2 Material
The two largest nationwide accessible registries of data containing informa-
tion about harm and serious safety incidents in health care were used (Study 
I-II). The first registry, or database, consisted of patient-reported incidents, that 
had been assessed by medical experts as preventable. The second registry, or 
database, consisted of health care-reported serious safety incidents. All harm 
and incidents reported during the years 2011 throughout 2016 from PHC and 
EDs were used, yielding a large amount of data, reported both from patients 
and from health care.
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For the qualitative study and the survey study (Study III-IV), exploring the 
views of risks and solutions, patients with experience of preventable harm in 
PHC and health care professionals working in PHC took part. An overview of 
the studies included in the thesis is seen in Table 2. 
Table 2. Studies included in the thesis
Study 
number
Aim Material Method Year
Study I To study which diag-
noses that are affected 
when it comes to diag-
nostic errors in PHC and 
the EDs
Patient-reported 
harm and health 
care-reported safety 
incidents
Cross-sectional 
study (historical 
cohort)
2011-
2016
Study II To study which patient-
related factors are asso-
ciated with a higher risk 
of preventable harm in 
PHC and in the EDs
Patient-reported 
harm and health 
care-reported safety 
incidents
Case-control 
study
2011-
2016
Study III To explore the views of 
patients and health care 
professionals in PHC 
regarding patient safety 
issues and possible solu-
tions for a safer care
Patients with expe-
rience of harm 
and health care 
professionals
Qualitative 
study 
2018
Study IV To explore how patients 
and health care profes-
sionals in PHC ranked 
specified risks and solu-
tions for patient safety 
issues
Patients with expe-
rience of harm 
and health care 
professionals
Survey study 2018
6.3 Methods
When exploring reported harm and serious safety incidents, the methods used 
were observational. We used a cross-sectional study with an historical cohort 
(Study I), to describe what kind of harm were present in PHC and the ED. To 
study factors that were associated with increased risk of harm a case-control 
study was used (Study II). 
To explore the views of patients and health care professionals, a qualitative 
content analysis of free text answers to structured questionnaires was preformed 
(Study III). With the results from the qualitative analysis, one survey to patients 
and one to health care professionals were constructed. In this survey study the 
respondents answered how big they thought specified risks were from 0 to 10, 
and they ranked specified solutions to mitigate risks (Study IV). 
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7 SUMMERY OF RESULTS
7.1 Study I
7.1.1 Type of harm
There were 507 cases, all PHC, from the health care-reported database. Of 
them, 64% were related to diagnostic errors and 9.1% were medication errors. 
There were 3,066 cases from the patient-reported harm database from PHC. 
Of them, 44% were related to diagnostic errors. Medication errors were iden-
tified in 1.6% cases. From the ED there were 1,322 cases from the patient-
reported database, of which 44% were related to diagnostic errors and 2.2% 
were related to medication.
7.1.2 Diagnostic errors
Of all diagnostic errors in the health care-reported database from PHC, cancer 
constituted 37%. The top three types were colorectal (22.0%), skin (17.0%) 
and kidney or bladder cancer (13.0%). Of non-cancer diagnoses, heart disease 
constituted 8.4% where most cases were myocardial infarction (56%). Fractures 
constituted 7.1% of the cases. Infections constituted 6.8%; these were mostly 
sepsis (23%), pneumonia (18%), and tuberculosis (14%). In the patient reported 
database from PHC, cancer constituted 23%. The three most common types 
were colorectal (17.0%), skin (12.0%) and lung cancer (8.4%). Of non-cancer 
diagnoses, fractures constituted 13%, infections constituted 11% and rupture/
injury of muscles or tendons constituted 10%. The two databases were not 
combined because they constitute two varied samples with data collected for 
different purposes and different degrees of seriousness.
Of all diagnostic errors in the ED from the patient-reported harm database, 
fractures constituted 24%. These were mostly hand and wrist fractures (29%). 
Rupture/injury of muscles or tendons constituted 19%; these were mostly ten-
dons of the fingers (28%), tendons of the rotator cuff (15%), and the Achilles 
tendon (13%). Infections constituted 10%, mostly appendicitis (41%).
7.2 Study II
In total, 4 536 patients and 44 949 controls were included the study. The cases 
had a higher degree of comorbidities (cardiovascular disease, psychiatric dis-
ease and cancer) than the controls. The controls were matched for age, sex, 
and residential area. 
Patients with psychiatric diagnoses had a nearly two-fold higher risk of being 
a reported case of preventable harm (Odds ratio (OR), 1.96; p < 0.001). The 
preventable harm was mostly somatic harm as oppose to psychiatric harm/
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suicide, primarily involving diagnostic errors (46% of all preventable harm in 
this category was due to diagnostic errors, the smaller categories were harm 
from falls, surgical complications, medication-related and health care associ-
ated infections). Adjusted for income and education there was still an increased 
risk (OR, 1.69; p < 0.001). 
Differences in income and education had some impact on the risk of preventable 
harm. The risk in the highest income group (highest quartile) was slightly lower 
(OR, 0.86; p < 0.01) than that in the lowest quartile. The highest educational 
level (postgraduate) had a lower risk (OR, 0.51; p < 0.01) than the education 
level of ≤9 years of school. 
7.3 Study III
There were 22 patients and 59 health care professionals that responded to the 
questionnaire. Three categories were experienced as central to patient safety: 
continuity of care, communication and competence, the later including skills, 
capacity and qualification. Sub categories are seen in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2. Categories and sub categories in qualitative analysis of free-text answers regard-
ing areas important for patient safety in health care.
Patients identified physician continuity, to see the same doctor repeatedly, as 
important. The patients had a vague sense of risk when care was experienced 
as fragmented. Patients also drew attention to problems concerning routines 
for follow-up. Patients felt they were left with the responsibility to make sure 
that follow-up took place. Patients also described patient-related factors as 
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an understanding of risks, for example that the patient waited too long before 
seeking care. The patients felt that the doctor did not listen to them, did not 
know what to do and that a major risk constituted of that the doctor did not 
examine them in the right way or not at all. The patients experienced that the 
doctors lacked competence. It is not known if the doctors did have the com-
petence but failed in communicating it or if there were an actual lack thereof. 
Health care professionals also identified poor physician continuity as a risk. 
In addition, they drew attention to the risk with transfer of care and that online 
medical records were critical to patient safety. Good communication between 
the health care professionals and the patient was stressed as important pref-
erably in the form of patient-centred consultations. Finally, team work was 
mentioned as important for safety.  
The overarching theme for the patients was the experience of being neglected, 
and for health care professionals the overarching theme was continuity of care. 
7.4 Study IV
There were 80 patients and 939 health care professionals that responded to the 
survey. Response rates were 26% for health care professionals and 19% for 
patients. The respondents were spread over the country, with varying distance 
to health care. Risks rated highest among patients were lack of knowledge, that 
the doctor can be careless or make cognitive mistakes and lack of continuity 
of care. Risks rated highest among health care professionals were; the lack of 
a national on-line medication platform, poor cooperation between primary and 
secondary care, that the same medication substance can have different trade 
names, stress, and lack of continuity of care. Most risks received similar rating 
regardless if it concerned diagnostic errors or medication errors. 
Both patients and health care professionals rated continuity of care as a highly 
important factor for safer care. Perceived knowledge was mostly believed to 
be important from the patients’ perspective. There was a difference between 
patients and health care professionals regarding the importance of knowledge 
that was not seen regarding continuity of care.
The patients emphasised the importance of a nationwide online medication 
record, to be thoroughly examined and routines for what to do if tests were fine 
but symptoms persisted. To achieve better continuity of care, the profession-
als wanted the patients to have their own GP and that there were a restricted 
number of patients per doctor. From secondary care they wanted medication 
review and prescriptions before discharge and clarifications of responsibili-
ties. The health care professionals wanted to use written individual plans for 
the diagnostic process, test-results and other information.
32
8 DISCUSSION
8.1 Main findings in relation to aims
There are some diagnoses that are more common than others when studying 
diagnostic errors in ambulatory care and those are cancer in PHC and fractures 
in the ED (Study I). 
Patients with psychiatric diagnoses have higher risk to be a case of reported 
preventable harm or involved in a serious safety incident, and especially at 
risk for diagnostic errors (Study II). 
Patients and health care professionals agree about the importance of continu-
ity of care to make health care safer but many patients that have experienced 
preventable harm feel neglected (Study III). 
Risks rated high among patients were experienced lack of knowledge of the 
doctor and lack of continuity of care. Risks rated high among health care pro-
fessionals were poor cooperation between primary and secondary care, stress, 
and lack of continuity of care. As solutions patients prioritised information 
about what to do if tests were fine but symptoms remained, and that GPs should 
examine them thoroughly. Health care professionals prioritised better continu-
ity of care by way of a personal GP with a restricted number of patients per 
doctor (Study IV). 
8.2 Comparison with literature 
The findings in Study I confirm findings in earlier studies that emphasise that 
diagnostic errors constitute a major problem in PHC and EDs [7, 8]. However, 
this study provides new information on the diagnoses that are most frequently 
involved. When it comes to which diagnoses that are affected by diagnostic 
error, there are some data from PHC in the United States regarding cancer 
diagnoses [45]. In our material colorectal cancer is the most common type 
of cancer while prostate cancer was reported as most common in the United 
States study. In the ED, the diagnostic distribution of missed diagnoses was 
similar to those of earlier studies [46], regarding fractures; however, our study 
provided more detail on the types of fractures. 
In Study II it is shown that patients with psychiatric disease have an increased 
risk to be a reported case of preventable harm or to be involved in serious safety 
incidents. Previous studies have shown that patients with psychiatric diagnoses 
are at higher risk of patient safety events [48]; however, these studies mostly 
included patients with schizophrenia and were conducted within the United States 
hospital setting, a setting that may not be generalisable to European conditions. 
In the present study, we included all psychiatric diagnoses in a European setting 
of first-contact care.
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We show that all kinds of psychiatric disease, in an ambulatory setting, are 
associated with higher risk of harm. To our knowledge, the type of harm 
affecting the patients with psychiatric diagnoses in PHC has not been studied 
previously. In this study harm is mainly somatic harm and for the most part 
due to diagnostic errors of somatic disease. Several large studies have con-
firmed that people with mental illness die prematurely and have higher rates 
of comorbidities than the general population [55, 56]. One reason for this may 
be “diagnostic overshadowing”, a process by which physical symptoms are 
misattributed to mental illness [57]. 
It could be argued that risk of harm could increase if a patient seeks health 
care often and therefore is more exposed to health care, for example because 
of high morbidity. However, patients with psychiatric illness seek health care 
later than other patients, resulting in more advanced disease by the time of 
diagnosis [58]. In our study, the most common type of harm in this group of 
patients was diagnostic error, which should be less likely if the patient presents 
later, with more evident symptoms. 
In Study III and IV we explore beliefs of different groups of health care pro-
fessionals in PCH and the beliefs of patients who have experienced prevent-
able harm. Clinician views have been studied earlier to some extent [50, 59], 
but patient views are more sparsely studied [60]. Particularly unique was the 
opportunity we had to study patients with experience of preventable harm. 
In Study III, the patients conveyed that they felt neglected during the patient-
provider encounter, that they were not listened to and that there should have 
been a better physical examination. This can be seen as an aspect of commu-
nication and has not been researched in detail before. However, studies from 
PHC have shown that the safety climate and openness of communication had 
the largest potential for improvement [61]. Maybe health care professionals 
did not communicate why specific examinations, diagnostic tests or x-rays 
were not made, thus failing to create a shared understanding in the patient-
doctor encounter. Patients also experienced lack of medical knowledge as a 
major risk while health care professionals did not emphasise that aspect. It is 
possible that the experienced lack of knowledge also could reflect poor com-
munication; that the clinician has the knowledge but that is not communicated 
to the patient. Health care professionals did identify lack in knowledge in 
colleagues as a potential problem, but not that they lacked knowledge them-
selves. This might reflect the “blind spot bias” [62, 63] - it is difficult to see 
your own shortcomings. 
The health care professionals and the patients understood many of the risks as 
caused by poor continuity of care. That is in accordance with earlier studies 
that identified continuity issues such as poor communication between primary 
34
and secondary care, and suggested standardised discharge summaries and 
more rigorous systems for follow-up of abnormal test results [50, 59]. Lack 
of continuity of care in PHC has been raised as a serious threat to safe care 
[64]. Furthermore, good continuity has been shown to result in fewer hospital 
admissions [65, 66] and lower mortality [67]. 
In Study IV, the same areas were pointed out as in Study III. Lack of continu-
ity of care and poor communication were rated as important risks, which is in 
alignment with previous studies [51, 65]. Stakeholders’ priorities concerning 
patient safety risks and solutions have received little attention so far, especially in 
patients exposed to preventable harm. Some studies including GPs and patients 
have suggested interesting patient-centred recommendations for improving 
patient safety, including patient-centred communication, timely appointments, 
active monitoring, teamwork and better work environment [51, 52], but these 
suggestions did not specifically come from patients that had experienced harm 
in PHC. In the present study, patients who had experienced harm considered 
lack of physician knowledge as a problem and wanted the doctor to examine 
them thoroughly. Health care professionals ranked risks and solutions with some 
similarities to a dataset from the UK [50, 59], like poor cooperation between 
primary and secondary care. The current study also points out the risk of lack 
of a national on-line medication platform and the need for clarification of the 
mission of PHC with a maximum number of patients per doctor.
8.3 Methodological considerations
Methods used in patient safety research include studying of malpractice claims 
and other patient-reported incidents, incident reports from health care, root cause 
analyses, chart reviews, questionnaires and interviews. Since each method only 
can answer some types of research questions, combining different methods 
can give a better understanding of a problem [68]. Mixed methods approach 
is therefore used in this thesis. This section intends to add to the methodology 
discussion offered in the separate studies, not repeating them. All methods and 
studies suffer from limitations and research has unfortunately showed poor 
reproducibility [69]. 
8.3.1 Study I and II
8.3.1.1 Choice of study design
Study I, of the diagnoses involved in diagnostic errors, was a cross-sectional 
study using a historical cohort. The design is suitable for estimating prevalence 
of a condition. It is also relatively cheap and easy to perform. The method was 
used because it could give a good description of which diagnoses that were 
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involved in diagnostic errors. However, a cross-sectional study only provides 
a snapshot of reality, even if the material for our snapshot was collected for 
six years. 
Study II, regarding which patient-related factors that could increase the risk of 
harm, was a case-control study. A case-control study is still an observational 
study by design, but are particularly suitable for studying risk factors associated 
with rare conditions (like reported preventable harm) [70]. There is no need 
to worry about loss to follow-up and associations can be established. It will 
have better scientific value than a cross-sectional study because matching to 
controls is possible. The method was used to be able to tell if there were any 
factors in the patients that were associated with an increased risk of being a 
reported case of harm or involved in serious safety incidents. 
8.3.1.2 Limitations
A disadvantage with an observational design like a cross-sectional study is that 
the patient cannot be followed longitudinally and causation cannot be inferred 
[71]. Case-control studies are also observational studies. The causal component 
is difficult to establish even if a cause-effect relationship between risk factors 
and disease many times are inferred from the results in these kinds of studies. 
Cross-sectional and case-control studies are susceptible to bias because of the 
retrospective nature of the data and the lack of control that the researcher has 
over items of interest. 
The two nationwide registries earlier mentioned were used. Regional registers 
exist but we did not have access to those which is a limitation. Reported cases 
are also known to be “the tip of the iceberg” [72], and might not be repre-
sentative of all cases. Harm from surgical or other visible injuries are easier 
to detect than for example a delayed diagnosis. In our material from ambula-
tory care harm from surgery was not common; however, if the cases had been 
collected via record reviewing, we could have acquired a broader sample of 
harm. Unfortunately, record reviewing is labour intense and since we were 
interested in serious harm, which is considered a rare event, using data based 
on reported harm seemed appropriate. 
Selection bias can be an issue when the material should be a representative 
sample of a larger population. Our population had experienced serious prevent-
able harm or been involved in serious safety incidents in contact with PHC or 
the ED. We used the mentioned nationwide databases and the selection bias 
consists of which cases have been entered into the databases. There is prob-
ably a systematic skew toward the more serious cases of harm and there are 
many cases that are probably never reported, both serious and not so serious.
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A major limitation in the case-control study is that there is no nationwide source 
of diagnoses from PHC, so we had to use the diagnoses from secondary care, 
including hospitals and specialised out-patient care. The diagnoses included 
those from psychiatric out-patient clinics. This results in a lack of the mild 
cases, that has never received a psychiatric diagnosis outside of PHC. 
Another draw-back is that the data for Study I and II were not originally col-
lected for the studies. They were incidents of harm or risk of harm, reported 
from patients and from health care. This fact results in the obvious draw-back 
of the structure and content of the material. We had to adjust the research in 
part by what information was available, for example there was seldom data on 
characteristics of the health care professional involved in the incident. Moreover, 
from the health care-reported data, we only used the data from PHC, not the 
EDs. The data from health care-reported incidents was not delivered in digital 
form and to convert the information to digital form was very labour intense, so 
we limited our efforts to PHC. The setback of that being that we did not have 
as much information from the EDs as from PHC, making conclusions harder 
to make with regards to the EDs.
8.3.1.3 Strengths
The mentioned limitations were, to some extent, mitigated by the large material 
of cases through national registries that represented all of Sweden, and a large 
number of controls that enabled statistical power. Confounding bias is not in 
place in Study I, since we have a descriptive cross-sectional study where we 
do not generate hypothesis about causes. We do not test associations between 
exposures and outcome. Information bias refer to the collection of informa-
tion about the cases included in the cross-sectional study. Using standardised 
and validated methods is important. The information we collected were age, 
sex, diagnosis, if harm had been experienced in PHC or in the ED and type of 
harm. None of that information was collected by self-reporting, like answer-
ing a questionnaire, but rather collected from data entered in the databases by 
trained professionals using the electronical health record. The information bias 
in the study should be acceptably low.
Ascertainment bias occurs when there is inaccurate ascertainment of the disease/
event of interest. In our study, that would be the ascertainment of preventable 
harm and type of harm. The coding of type of error was made by trained health 
care professionals working with patient safety which hopefully mitigated that 
bias. Description of how the evaluation of preventable harm was supposed to 
be done was well defined and was recorded with International Classification 
of Diseases version 10 (ICD-10) codes. The inter-rater reliability was 92%. 
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The validity in the case-control study (Study II) is dependent on the repre-
sentative selection of both the cases and the controls. In this study, the cases 
are those in the nationwide databases, with the limitations mentioned above. 
The controls were matched for sex, age and residential area, and came from 
the same cohort, the nationwide data of residents in Sweden. It is important 
in case-control studies that controls come from the same cohort so that they 
have the same chance to be detected as cases. The residential areas were 
small, about 1000 inhabitants per area. We also used 10 controls per case to 
strengthen the design. 
The association between patient-related factors and reported safety incidents, 
was estimated by OR, using conditional logistic regression models for the 
matched case–control data. OR is preferred because it quantifies the strength of 
the association, in relation to other factors in the study. We looked at crude as 
well as adjusted analyses. The crude analyses were interesting because when we 
meet patients, they are “crude”, they are not “controlled” for different factors. 
Therefore, if patients with psychiatric disease experience an even greater risk 
of harm if they have low income and low education, that information might 
not help you if you do not ask those questions in the clinical setting. 
The learning opportunities from Study I and II, being observational studies, 
are not as great as would be potentially possible with an experimental design. 
However, when experimental designs are not possible or ethical, good lessons 
can be made from observational studies. 
8.3.2 Study III
8.3.2.1 Choice of study design
Study III, regarding what health care professionals and patients thought of 
safety risks in PHC, was a qualitative study. It was based on free-text answers 
to a structured questionnaire with open-ended questions and the answers 
were analysed qualitatively with content analysis. Qualitative research is an 
exploratory scientific method. It gathers non-numerical data, it describes and 
relate meaning. The learning that can come from qualitative research is of 
great value and detail. Qualitative methods can answer questions that quan-
titative research cannot and can give a nuanced picture of a problem, such as 
what factors and circumstances that may lead to an error. The qualitative base 
was appropriate for the research question, to find out the views of patients 
and health care professionals. Qualitative methods have better possibilities to 
understand the context of a problem and are more flexible for an exploratory 
analysis of a problem [73].
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8.3.2.2 Limitations
A disadvantage of content analysis is that it is time consuming. The method 
chosen was adequate for the research question but if focus groups or inter-
views had been made, solely or in combination with the questionnaires, more 
information could have been obtained. 
The subjectivity that is in the nature of qualitative research can make it diffi-
cult to detach from the data and to avoid bias. Bias will lead to a distortion of 
reality and affect the validity and reliability of findings, described below [73] . 
There are two main types of biases in qualitative research, participant bias and 
researcher bias. Participant bias stems from that the participates/respondents 
respond to the questions based on what they think the right answer might be 
or what is socially acceptable (social acceptability bias), rather than what they 
really think. It is important that the questions are formulated so that the par-
ticipants feel accepted no matter what they answer. Moreover, there can be a 
friendliness bias meaning that participants may agree to questions to complete 
an interview. The friendliness bias can be mitigated via open-ended questions. 
There can also be a habituation bias when participants provide the same answers 
in response to similarly-worded questions. Finally, there can be a sponsor 
bias if the participants are opinionated about the sponsor of the research. The 
researcher needs to maintain neutral when formulating the questions. 
Researcher bias is when the researchers unknowingly interpret data to meet 
a hypothesis or only include data that they think is relevant, called confirma-
tion bias. The researchers strengthen what they thought in the first place [73]. 
Furthermore, the researchers can introduce bias through the order the ques-
tions are asked, called question-order bias. Participants can judge and compare 
questions based on their response to earlier questions. It is important to ask 
general questions first and specific questions later. Finally, leading questions 
and wording bias can affect the answers and it is important to keep the questions 
simple and avoid words that could introduce bias. Furthermore, the research-
ers need a deep knowledge of the problem domain, and at the same time have 
understanding of how the pre-knowledge can affect the analysis [73]. 
A limitation in this study was that the patients and the health care profession-
als did not receive the exact same questionnaire, which may reflect a lower 
dependability of our study. We chose different questions because we thought 
that it would be easier for the patients to respond if they reflected over the harm 
that they had experienced. In the use of a written questionnaire we received a 
material that was not with as much depth as focus groups or interviews prob-
ably would have been. 
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8.3.2.3 Strengths
The method is reductive but can at the same time obtain information at a higher 
logical level. Furthermore, the method can disregard the context that produced 
the text which we tried to mitigate, by only using researchers that work in the 
same setting (e.g. PHC). We recognised the possibility that the researchers pre-
understanding might have affected the analysis and might have added mean-
ings, not actually justified by the data. The pre-understanding can enable, but 
also restrict, the learning that can result from such a study. The coding was 
validated via the senior researcher in the team who coded part of the material 
without knowledge of earlier coding by the other two researchers. With the 
answers received, we did see saturation; that new areas were not mentioned 
in the end of the analysis, strengthening the value of the study and making the 
findings more relevant to use. We studied the same context, e.g. PHC, that we 
wished to learn more about. 
To keep the participant bias low, we used open-ended questions. The social 
acceptability bias is probably low in these kinds of questions regarding patient 
safety. The friendliness bias is thought to be low since the questions were not 
formulated so one could agree. Moreover, sponsor bias is probably low since 
the study was supported by the Region Stockholm which is the care deliverer 
in the region. 
Researcher bias is always in place in qualitative studies. The answers by the 
respondents are to be grouped and analysed objectively but the researcher has 
a preunderstanding that can be difficult to separate oneself from. To mitigate 
that bias there were three researchers working with the material and discuss-
ing meaning of the answers. Question-order bias could have been in place 
since we did have the most general question last. We did in the last question 
to health care professionals, however, ask “Please give other suggestions on 
how to reduce the risk of patient harm in primary care (within all areas)”. We 
tried to avoid leading questions with the use of open-ended questions.
Recruitment of participants is one of the strengths of the study. Patients that 
had experienced harm were recruited randomly from the patient-reported reg-
istry. The health care professionals all worked in the Region Stockholm which 
includes rural as well as urban areas with different distance to health care. The 
health care professionals included physicians as well as nurses and practice 
managers to broaden the perspective. 
We took inspiration from earlier questionnaires that were conducted for the same 
purpose and we discussed with the authors about their reflections of advantages 
and disadvantages of their study design [50, 59]. In these previous studies, the 
authors tried to use their questionnaire not only to health care professionals but 
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also to patients. However, they were unable to use of the answers because the 
patients did not seem to understand the questions that were asked. Therefore, 
we asked our patients what they thought of their personal experience of harm. 
We had the advantage of having a sample of patients that had experienced 
preventable harm due to a diagnostic error or a medication error in PHC. We 
received valuable answers with the draw-back that the patients did not answer 
the same questions as the health care professionals did. A limitation we cre-
ated ourselves was that we excluded patients that had passed away due to the 
harm. We choose to do so, as it could be emotionally difficult for the relatives 
to be approached with the questionnaire. 
8.3.3 Study IV
8.3.3.1 Choice of study design
In Study IV we asked patients and health care professionals to rank specified 
risks and solutions to patient safety issues. The method of a survey study is 
adequate when the opinions or thoughts of many people are needed. The survey 
was created so that the answers could be statistically processed.
8.3.3.2 Limitations
In this study there was a low response rate (26% for health care professionals 
and 19% for patients), which limits the possibility to draw conclusions from 
the material. The persons that do not respond to a survey usually differ sig-
nificantly and systematically from those who do respond. Instead of spreading 
a link to the survey we chose to collect e-mail addresses and have a known 
response rate, that unfortunately became low. In the group of health care pro-
fessionals, we sent out two reminders but in the patient group we only sent 
out one reminder, out of respect for those not wanting to be reminded of the 
harm experienced. 
Response rate is of great importance in survey studies. The response rate in sur-
vey studies has dropped over the years which is unfortunate, but low response 
rates do not always correlate to lower study validity [74]. Most important with 
a high response rate is when the material needs to be representative of a larger 
population in order to yield useable results. In this study we explored the opin-
ions of patients and health care professionals, and the portion that answered 
has probably thought more about these issues of safety than those that did not 
answer. The results point to where focus and resources might best be directed 
and therefore the low response rate might not affect the validity as much as 
in a purely epidemiological study. However, the low response rate is a major 
limitation and the survey needs to be further tested in a setting where better 
response rate is to be expected.
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Sampling bias is related to the way the respondents are selected. In our survey 
we chose patients randomly and nationwide but used a convenience sample for 
health care professionals. However, we tried to have health care professionals 
with representation from the whole country. A type of response bias can occur 
if a survey has many questions, there can then be a fatigue at the end that can 
make the reliability of the last answers lower. There is also an increased risk 
that respondents do not follow through and answer all questions. In the survey 
the patients had 15 questions (rating risks and options) and the health care 
professionals 42, posing an evident risk for being too extensive. 
Habituation bias can have affected the answers since there were questions 
formulated very similar but dealt with diagnostic errors or medication errors. 
Another response bias is that responders might want to answer the most “cor-
rect” answer, called demand characteristics bias. In our survey the questions 
were not formulated to imply a correct answer but there was a possibility that 
some respondents felt that they should rate every problem high. The questions 
could have been formulated in a different manner, like 10 problems and you 
can only rate one of them a 10, one a 9, one an 8, and so forth, forcing the 
respondents to rank the problems compared to each other. 
In this survey we first asked how big they thought a problem was, then they 
were to rank possible solutions by drag-and-drop for that problem. Then we 
went on to the next problem. When we had asked about all problems regard-
ing medication we asked in the same manner about diagnostic errors. The 
respondents might have been affected by what they had answered in the part 
about medication and had a bias to similar responses about diagnostic errors. 
The questions could have been randomised but then there would have been a 
risk that the respondents would not be clear about if the question was about 
medication errors or diagnostic errors. The solutions that were to be ranked 
are written in an order and there is a risk in online surveys that option that you 
read first is picked more often. 
8.3.3.3 Strengths
The face validity of a survey is of course crucial. The questions used in this 
survey was constructed on the base of the qualitative study (Study III) to sup-
port the relevance of the questions. The response rate was low but the more 
respondents there are, the more likely that valuable information can be obtained, 
and we had over 1000 respondents so the results could point toward areas for 
further research. However, the survey needs further validation.
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8.4 Implications for health care
Thomas and his colon cancer, described in the prologue, can be seen as a 
synthesis of what the studies in this thesis portrait. We are part of a complex 
system where some groups of patients are extra vulnerable. The individual 
patient might not be resilient, and our system has flaws and fails sometimes to 
help our patients. Thomas had colon cancer, but the diagnosis was delayed. He 
had a history of depression. He felt neglected. The doctor felt stressed and no 
rectal examination was made. There was a lack of continuity of care. Thomas 
did not receive advice about what should prompt him to come back. No one 
looked at the lab results that arrived after the doctor had moved to the next 
practice. The result showed anaemia, but no one noticed. 
To work proactively with safety and strengthen continuity of care can already 
be recommended (Study III-IV) and other studies [64]. Specific diagnoses, like 
colorectal cancer, were seen to be common among serious diagnostic errors 
(Study I). Possible ways to improve safety and resilience could be the use of 
a clear and written plan for follow-up, with advice on what to do if symptoms 
persist, so called safety-netting [75], and a personal GP with a restricted number 
of patients per doctor to facilitate continuity of care (Study III-IV). There could 
also be taken measures for reducing the risk of diagnostic errors for patients 
with psychiatric disease (Study II), maybe a contact nurse for this patient group 
to improve patient centred care and lower the risk of no-shows during follow-
ups. These measures could be tested as ways to make the diagnostic process 
more resilient. Different solutions are probably needed in different settings, 
but system improvement will be required [9].
Some new knowledge needs more studies to validate the findings before 
implementation and other knowledge is ready for practice. To implement best 
evidence is usually done by QI efforts but it can be hard to conduct QI in PHC 
because of stressful environment and lack of knowledge [76]. Furthermore, 
the plasticity and complexity of the health care system make work in QI and 
patient safety difficult. The context and the demands change constantly, and 
it is of great importance that we build resilient processes and implement solu-
tions for safer care, preferable in co-production with patients. 
Resilient solutions regarding safety and other improvements could be described 
as a boat ride (Figure 3). In the boat we have the patient and the health care 
professionals (in reality they are in plural). Together they embark on the journey 
of QI for a safer care. However, they need to be aware of other boats (other 
QI projects), navigation marks, buoy beacons (possible ways to navigate) and 
rocks in the sea (obstacles). 
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The wind is blowing from the north (disturbances, external pressures of man-
agement, budget cuts and to see many patients per day) and from the south 
(contradicting goals, to follow evidence-based medicine and deliver person-
centred, high quality care). The passengers on the boat need to design improve-
ments that will work, that will sustain and endure in this context. Sometimes 
the wind is stronger than usual and might change direction quite sudden. To 
add life wests to the passengers could keep them safer (and more resilient). The 
life wests could represent good work environment with the necessary slack to 
be able to bounce back from different kinds of strains. 
The first step in QI-work is to map the practice/hospital ward/ ED. The mapping 
is usually focused on which health care professionals there are, which patients 
come there, what the purpose of the work is and what the processes and the 
patterns are (including the results). With the glasses of resilience and work-
as-done this mapping will have to be done somewhat differently. Apart from 
a deep understanding of the WAD, there also needs to be an understanding of 
what pressures and incentives that exist. The rest of the QI journey also needs 
the be dealt with through the lens of resilience to lead to sustainable results. 
Figure 3. The journey of quality improvement for a safer care
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Different kinds of patient factors, doctor factors and system factors are vari-
ables that float around in our three-dimensional system of care. To be resilient 
we need to recognise WAD and that we all make mistakes, despite our good 
intentions. Our own shortcomings can be particularly hard to see since we seem 
to have a filter function disguising them, called the blind spot bias [62]. Are we 
willing to see our own part in the system, contributing to errors, even though 
tradition and culture tell us that health care professionals are supposed to be 
correct and have all the answers? PHC is so diverse so working with safety can 
pose certain challenges. While it is possible to use check-lists in an operating 
room, not much of PHC can be standardised enough for check-lists to work. 
The approach of resilience and safety-II is more applicable in this setting. 
8.5 Implications for research
Clinical cognition is not fully understood and needs further exploring. More 
research is needed to clarify how our medical reasoning and decision-mak-
ing works, and when and why they may fail. Under what circumstances do 
medical reasoning work at its best? Probably not a single clinician at a time. 
Different kinds of team work seem to enhance the ability for good medical 
decision-making. 
These studies have several implications for future research in the area. Diagnostic 
error is the most common serious safety event in PHC, and the time is ripe 
for action research. Solutions that use modern information communication 
technology and maybe artificial intelligence could be interesting. Electronic 
health record-based triggers can already be used to detect potential delays in 
cancer diagnosis [77, 78]. 
Transition of care, and fragmented information in large, put the patients at 
risk of harm and as seen in this thesis, patients with psychiatric diseases are at 
extra high risk. Both continuity of care and patient engagement can be ways 
to make care safer and more resilient. The action research should maybe start 
there. The diagnoses with the most severe consequences for the patients should 
be prioritised, seen to malpractice claims in the United States that was cancer, 
vascular events and infections [79]. In the PHC setting cancer was the most 
common among serious diagnostic errors [12]. 
The risk for diagnostic errors could be mitigated through improved diagnos-
tic safety-netting, defined as “Information shared with a patient or their carer 
designed to help them identify the need to seek further medical help if their 
condition fails to improve, or if they have concerns about their health” [80]. 
Primary and emergency care will always deal with a high degree of uncer-
tainty and to involve the patients and their carer in safety-netting could be a 
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way to increase the resilience of the diagnostics process. The safety-netting 
advice should include the existence of uncertainty, what exactly to look out 
for, how exactly to seek further help and what to expect about time course 
[75]. Implementation of structured safety-netting advice could be a way to 
improve communication and shared situational awareness. There is some 
research about preferred structure [81, 82], but action studies are needed both 
to evaluate how to implement safety-netting and the effect of properly applied 
safety-netting advice [83]. 
There have been studies trying to reduce diagnostic errors well described in a 
review article from 2019 [84]. Quite a few studies in the ED setting have been 
performed, including computer assistance or checklist via an audit system, 
with effect in some of the studies [85, 86]. However, few studies have been 
performed in PHC. Checklists have been tried in PHC without convincing 
results [87]. In one study there was a decrease in loss-to-follow-up via a com-
puterised trigger system [88]. There have been attempts with early diagnostic 
suggestions in the electronic health record [89, 90], and regarding medication 
errors there has been studies of educational training, structured process change, 
review methods, and patient education [91]. To our knowledge, no interven-
tion has had a wide spread.
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9 CONCLUSION 
Our findings indicate that the most frequently missed diagnoses were cancers 
in PHC and fractures in the ED. Patients with both mild and severe psychiat-
ric illness were at higher risk of preventable harm in first-contact health care. 
Patients, as well as health care professionals, understood risks and how to 
reduce risks as related to three main categories: continuity of care, communica-
tion and competence. As solutions patients prioritised routines for what to do 
if tests were fine but symptoms persisted, the use of a nationwide medication 
platform on-line and that the GP should examine them thoroughly. Health care 
professionals prioritised better continuity of care by way of a personal GP with 
a restricted number of patients per doctor, and to improve communication with 
patients by using individual written plans. 
These studies support future work for a safer and more resilient health care 
with a more proactive approach. There are suggestions from the level of the 
GP practice up to the national level. With focus on continuity of care, better 
communication and knowledge, solutions can be tested. In addition, the inclu-
sion of the perspectives of patients and health care professionals could increase 
the possibility of developing and implementing relevant counter-measures for 
safety risks in PHC. The solutions that patients and health care professionals 
prioritise and agree on should probably be tested first.
Still, more research is needed to explore effective interventions for safer care. 
When new types of solutions for better and safer care are tested, they need to 
be thoroughly studied and evaluated. The next step could be to test interven-
tions that proactively support a system in improved accuracy in diagnosis and 
correct medication, for example, an intervention to improve continuity of care 
[67] or practice safety-netting [83]. That could probably improve the resilience 
of the system in question. 
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10 EPILOGUE
This journey has been valuable for me in many ways. I have had the time 
to deepen my knowledge within patient safety and to work with interesting 
people in numerous projects. I have gained new perspectives on safety while 
I have learned about the scientific field. Hopefully, I have contributed to the 
field and become a better doctor during the process. I believe that health care 
is currently stepping up regarding the issue of safety in PHC and the ED. I am 
excited to see what the next decade will bring.
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11 SVENSK SAMMANFATTNING
Patientsäkerhet innebär skydd mot vårdskada. Den här avhandlingen handlar 
om patientsäkerhet och använder resiliens som perspektiv. Resiliens inne-
bär att ha ett systemperspektiv och att inte bara lära av vad som går fel, utan 
framför allt lära av vad som går bra för att göra sitt system säkrare. På så 
sätt arbetar resilienta system proaktivt med säkerhet. Den här avhandlingen 
bidrar till forskningsfältet genom att studera patientsäkerhet i primärvård och 
på akutmottagningar, och den nya kunskapen skulle kunna användas för att 
göra vården säkrare.
Vi undersökte allvarliga vårdskador och risk för allvarlig vårdskada i primärvården 
och på akutmottagningar, och kunde konstatera att diagnostiska fel var den 
 vanligaste kategorin. Med diagnostiskt fel avses att en patient inte fått rätt 
 diagnos i rimlig tid för att kunna få adekvat behandling och att det ska ha 
 funnits  uppenbara möjligheter att ställa rätt diagnos. Den finns en kunskapslucka 
 gällande vilka diagnoser som vanligen berörs när det kommer till diagnostiska 
fel. I vårt material var cancer vanligast i primärvården och frakturer var  vanligast 
på akutmottagningarna (studie I).
Vi studerade sedan vilka patientrelaterade faktorer som var associerade med ökad 
risk för rapporterad vårdskada, eller risk för allvarlig vårdskada, i primärvård 
och på akutmottagningar. Vi fann att patienter med psykiatriska diagnoser 
hade en ökad risk att drabbas, framför allt i form av försening av allvarliga 
somatiska diagnoser (studie II).
Den sista delen av avhandlingen handlar om vad patienter och personal anser 
vara de största riskområdena inom primärvården och vilka lösningar de skulle 
föredra. Gällande risker framträdde kontinuitet, kommunikation och kunskap 
som de viktigaste att förbättra. När det kom till lösningar lyftes vikten av 
information om vad man ska göra när prover och undersökningar är bra men 
symtom kvarstår, en nationell digital läkemedelslista som såväl vårdpersonal 
som patient och apotek kan logga in på, och en egen husläkare med listningstak 
för en förbättrad kontinuitet (studie III-IV).
Dessa studier stöder fortsatt arbete för en säkrare och mer resilient vård. 
Resultaten i studierna ligger till grund för förslag från vårdcentralsnivå upp 
till nationell nivå. För att underlätta implementering och för att öka chanserna 
för goda resultat kan de lösningar som patienter och personal var överens om 
testas först, gärna i former av medskapande med patienter. Fokus bör ligga 
på kontinuitet, förbättrad kommunikation och kunskap. Nästa steg skulle 
kunna vara att testa interventioner som proaktivt stödjer system till förbättrad 
diagnostik och korrekt medicinering, till exempel en intervention som stärker 
kontinuitet eller som använder sig av specifika råd för när, var och hur man 
bör söka vård på nytt (safety-netting). Sådana proaktiva interventioner skulle 
antagligen öka resiliensen i det aktuella systemet.
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